Lehman Brothers

Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) New Limits

The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) has issued a reminder that from 1st January the compensation limits for investment, insurance and home finance intermediation claims are changing.

This is a vital piece of protection for UK consumers. The default of Lehman Brothers probably the most recent high profile investment claim shows the importance of this scheme in both protecting consumers and maintaining confidence in the UK financial services industry.

Important though, you are only protected when using a UK authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority firm. With the opening of European boarders to financial services business a firm may be authorised by passport of services to the UK. This does not mean regulated by the UK FSA and does not afford protection from the FSCS.

Many offshore advisory firms extol the virtues of their UK trained advisers but that means nothing if things go wrong – and they do!

With the surge of individuals leaving the UK for offshore residency it is essential to ask your adviser searching questions about how you are protected. What regulator covers the advice and what compensation schemes exist? Professional insurance is a requirement but if you would have to seek redress through a foreign court then caveat emptor. Remember advice is a professional service however friendly the meetings and discussions become.

The FSCS new limits will apply to claims against firms declared in default on or after 1st January 2010 as announced by the FSA earlier this year.

According to the scheme, the new limits will make it easier for consumers to understand the cover the FSCS provides.

Overview of the new limits applying to eligible claims:

  • Investments: Provision and mediation of investments protection for 100 per cent of £50,000.

 

  • Home finance mediation: Advising on or arranging house purchase finance: protection for 100 per cent of £50,000.

 

  • Insurance Business: Non-compulsory insurance provision (both general and life insurance) protection for 90 per cent of the claim, with no upper limit.

 

  • General Insurance intermediation: Non-compulsory general insurance and pure protection contracts (for example, term, critical illness and income protection insurance) protection for 90 per cent of the claim, with no upper limit. 

Why does this happen?

Five men jailed for using offshore financial advisers to attract investments in supposed commercial property loans

Time and time again the media tell us of the latest financial fraud. The astonishing schemes perpetrated by the likes of Bernie Madoff; they all have an uncanny ability to take in not only individual investors but also some of the most high profile professionals.

The story is always the same: investment returns unavailable elsewhere or safe schemes promising inflated returns; too good to be true.

Mainstream UK investments with well known institutions are now so intensively regulated that fund managers have to abide by an investment strategy and the placement of funds is overseen by a custodian, typically a bank. Funds are also held in nominee accounts so if the institution fails investors’ money should not be at risk. So whilst not removing investment risk at least you can be sure your money will not end up in someone’s pocket paying for a luxury lifestyle.

UK Independent Financial Advisers (IFAs) are responsible for conducting appropriate checks on investments to ensure suitability for their clients.

The UK also has the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) which is going to be a huge relief to investors who have found recently that the counterparty risk of their particular investment was held by Lehman Brothers.

The latest court case sees a firm operating under the name Prudential Commercial Investments (“PCI”). The scheme was a fraud from inception; around £1.93 million was defrauded from 56 from investors

PCI's investors were predominantly British ex-pats retired or living abroad. They believed on the basis of advice from their local financial advisers that their funds would be channelled into a lending scheme for commercial property buyers in the UK secured by mortgages and would reap high returns. 

Instead the fraudsters diverted investors' funds to offshore accounts for their personal benefit. Two of the defendants pleaded guilty. Verdicts on the other three were returned at Worcester Crown Court yesterday and HHJ McCreath, Recorder of Worcester, passed sentenced on all five.

The PCI operation

The PCI group of companies has no connection with the well known Prudential Assurance Company, although a number of the victims thought that the companies were linked. PCI Ltd was incorporated in Belize, PCI Inc in the Seychelles and PCI Admin in the UK.

The Seychelles Company was the one used for marketing and its bank account received the investors' monies. No promotion was undertaken by PCI directly with investors; instead PCI approached local financial advisers operating in the ex-pat investment sector. Many of the financial advisers had their own established client base and PCI relied on them to pull in the business.

The PCI website, its business and sales literature intended to impress financial advisers and investors alike that PCI and its commercial loans business was a safe and attractive investment opportunity. 

PCI offered the financial advisers a commission incentive of between 4%-6% and relied substantially on the trust that investors had in their financial advisers to advise them on their financial affairs. PCI made up that it had a five-year trading track record, that it worked with well-known and reputable service providers and that it had a portfolio of some US$20 million. 

Those financial advisers who agreed to promote the PCI scheme might at best be unwitting pawns in this designed fraud but as reasonably competent professionals should have been able to see through the glossy brochures and lack of accountability. Not all financial advisers approached were persuaded by the PCI sales pitch but some were taken in and ultimately some were brought down when the fraud was discovered and lost the trust of their clients.

There is no doubt that the financial advisory firms are at fault. The relationship with a client is a professional arrangement. Schemes promoted by financial advisers wherever they may be resident require the ability to conduct a full due diligence on the investments.

For many UK authorised and regulated independent financial advisers (IFAs) the Financial Services Authority feels like an over burdening authority but compared with many sunnier jurisdictions the FSA provides welcome security to investors using financial services products recommended by UK IFAs.

The PCI scheme was heavily promoted offshore where either no regulation exists or is so light-touch that it has little power or value to protect the consumer.

Investigation and Proceedings.

The scheme operated between March 2003 and March 2004 and came to an end when West Mercia Police received a tip-off that the scheme was too good to be true. 

The scale of the damage could have been much greater had the operation not been interrupted by the prompt intervention of West Mercia Police's Economic Crime Unit. The investigation commenced in March 2004 and the defendants were charged in June 2008 with prison sentences

Confiscation of assets is to be sought. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) will ask the Court to compensate the victims of the PCI investment scheme from any assets that are recovered from the convicted.

Conclusion

Living and being resident offshore brings many advantages but in the complex world of financial products it may be worth looking back to the UK for sound secure advice. There are some highly professional firms offshore and many highlight the capabilities and UK qualifications of their staff. So why don’t they remain UK FSA authorised and regulated and provide services offshore?

The answer may well be that these companies regard the regulatory burden on both the company and the products as too onerous. The transparency requirement of UK advice and products has not managed to even cross the English Channel, and thus fraudulent products can creep through into the offerings of offshore advisers.

The UK is not perfect but at least if something goes wrong there is an established procedure to seek and attain redress. Caveat emptor has never been so important when dealing with offshore financial services products.

A “Third Way” for UK Pensions and QROPS

"Third Way" - An Introduction:

This is an explanatory document about the evolution of Pensions in the UK now encompassing the benefits of globalisation, guarantees and Qualifying Recognised Overseas Pension Schemes (QROPS).

The Third Way looks at solutions to the volatility in investment markets and what appear to be long term low interest rates. These factors are beyond the control of individual investors but that have a huge impact on the willingness of individuals to make provision for retirement. 

The recent credit crisis has hugely damaged Pensions and Pensioners. Long held assumptions relating to pensions seem to have been swept away. The stock market’s volatility has resulted in pensions significantly dropping in value. The FTSE 100 index is still more than 20% lower than its peak in December 1999. The Bank of England have printed money to buy gilts, employers are cutting contributions - often substantially - to employee pension schemes and annuity rates have plummeted. The timing of this could not have been worse.

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Managing Cash and Fixed Interest Deposits

Traditionally a cash deposit was seen as a no risk investment. Perhaps the only risk being attributed to the effects of inflation reducing the capital buying power. 

The considerable differences between money market funds were brought to light recently, when a number of investors using the vehicles as a shelter from the tumultuous markets saw their cash assets tumble in value.  

The most high profile fund to hit the headlines was the Standard Life Pension Sterling fund. Investors say they were led to believe this was a pure cash fund, therefore providing a lower-risk investment. It was, in fact, using more complex instruments exposed to the weakening American mortgage market, and the fund dropped in value quite dramatically in January.  

Floating rate notes (FRNs) and asset-backed securities were introduced to the portfolio without the risks being explained to investors.

Prior to the announcement of the reduction in value on January 14, the fund held over £2 billion in assets and had nearly 100,000 investors. These investors were told that, owing to exposure to mortgage-backed securities, the fund’s unit price was to be diminished by 4.8%, wiping off £100m of its total value.  

A statement released on February 11 said: “We have listened to feedback and the concerns of our customers … and have decided to put customers back in the position they would have been before the valuation adjustment on 14 January 2009 ... some customers would not have expected the value of their units to fall by this extent in one day, based on the information we provided on the nature of the fund.”  

After admitting there was insufficient information available on the risk level of the fund, Standard Life pumped in £100m of its own money and recompensed customers who had left the fund after the adjustment was announced. 

Money market funds saw huge inflows in 2008. Equities were plummeting, bonds were not doing much better and interest rates were high – around the 5% mark for most of the year.

Cash was king. Figures from the Investment Management Association (IMA) show that over £242m (net) was pumped into the Money Market sector for the calendar year of 2008, with a monthly peak reached in July when inflows were £55m. 

Most investors use the vehicles as income producers, particularly during periods of high interest rates or as safe havens from falling markets, because placing cash in a variety of bank or building society accounts is perceived to be lower risk than investing in the stock or bond markets. Others might use money market funds because they offer a way to access cash quickly, and those approaching retirement commonly begin to switch their pension pot out of riskier equities or bonds in favour of lower risk options.  

So, what went so wrong with the FRNs and asset-backed securities last year that caused the losses in the first place?  

The problems began at the start of the credit crunch, in August 2007, when the enormous amount of debt consumers and corporates had taken on began to unwind. The institutions providing asset-backed securities were themselves rated AAA, but the underlying holdings – loans, mortgages and other types of debt – were lent to borrowers of a subprime nature. As times became difficult for the borrowers of this debt, defaults on payments began to rise. But the real problem was the lack of confidence in the market, which caused capital values to plummet. Investor confidence in the banks weakened further, as the likes of Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers sought government help or went bust, leading to a severe plummet in FRN values in the autumn of 2008.  

Standard Life’s fund was not the only one involved in the more complex cash instruments. In the IMA’s Money Market sector, Threadneedle’s UK Money Securities fund suffered the largest fall. For the year to June 11, 2009, the fund declined by 21.44%, compared with a peer group average gain of 0.7%, according to Morningstar.  

Just over a year ago, in April, 2008, the fund sat on £472m in assets but this has since plummeted to £146.3m.  

The manager attributes the performance falls to depressed values in FRNs, which amounted to 28.3% of the portfolio at the end of April, but were as high as 40% in September  2007.  

However, he defends his decision to invest in FRNs in the first place, because prior to the credit crunch he says they “typically traded at or close to par and were subject to narrow dealing spreads” and that their asset backing was considered a strength.  

Many managers perceived them to be low risk and liquid instruments pre-credit crunch.

The M&G High Interest fund was another money market vehicle that has suffered losses in the past year, falling by 5.71%. 

Other funds that saw significant losses over the one-year time-frame include F&C Sterling Enhanced Cash (which fell 10.72%), and Prudential’s Maximum Income Trust (which fell 4.62%), which is managed by M&G.  

Yet, some funds in the sector managed to beat the peer group average return, despite interest rates radically reducing in those 12 months. At the top of the sector is the Premier UK Money Market fund, which gained 4.07%. The manager says the outperformance is down to holding “plain vanilla, liquid assets” and calling the money curve correctly.  

Future categorization:  

The proposal is to leave the Money Market sector unchanged, but create a new sector with a “cash-like” definition – funds here will not be “no risk” as they are still exposed to credit and liquidity risk, but they will be lower risk than those funds that invest in other money market instruments. However, the ABI did express a concern that there is a possibility that the returns may not exceed the charges levied, especially in a low interest rate environment.

Nonetheless, the new sector name will either be Capital Stability Fund or Treasury and Deposit Fund. 

The IMA also released a statement to say it is reviewing its Money Market sector to coincide with what is happening at a European level, as well as the ABI’s review, and is considering whether to add a “cash like” sector.  

The IMA, says this will harmonise the sectors alongside the ABI’s and ensure customers understand what they are buying. However, there are only a small number of funds in the sector (32) and this will be considered in the review, which the Performance Category and Review Committee (PCRC) is likely to conclude in the summer.  

 

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